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The Determinants of Dutch Capital Structure Choice
Abstract
This paper uses the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique to empirically
test the determinants of capital structure choice for Dutch firms. We include major fac-
tors identified by capital structure theories and construct proxies for these factors with
consideration of specific institutional settings in the Netherlands. We also carefully
rescale the observed variables in order to conform with the linear structure of the model
and the multivariate normality assumption. Our empirical results shed many important
insights on Dutch firms’ financing behavior. In particular, we identified important fac-
tors that have so far been ignored in the literature for the Dutch capital structure choice.
Furthermore our results provide evidence supporting the “static trade-off" hypothesis.
While the “pecking-order" behavior is observed for Dutch firms, our results cast doubt
on the rationale of asymmetric information behind the “pecking-order" hypothesis. We
also point out that the static cross-section evidence is not sufficient to conclude whether
or not the management of Dutch firms is entrenched. Models based on the dynamic
behavior of firms’ capital structure choice are called for such tests.
JEL Classification: G32, C31.
Key Words: Capital Structure, Structural Equation Model, Dutch Firms
1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, theories on a firm’s capital structure choice have evolved along
many directions. Different models have been built in the literature to explain a firm’s financ-
ing behavior1. Among the main competing theories in explaining a firm’s capital structural
choice are the static trade-off hypothesis (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) and the “pecking-
order" hypothesis (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The static trade-off hypothesis
claims that the optimal level of a firm’s leverage is achieved by weighing the benefits of debt
financing against the cost of potential financial distress. From a dynamic point of view, it
is argued that the optimal leverage level can change due to changes in a firm’s profitability
level, non-debt tax shield level, etc. Therefore, even when a firm’s leverage changes from
year to year, the trade-off hypothesis cannot be simply rejected because the optimal lever-
age level itself may differ over time. The “pecking order" hypothesis claims that a firm’s
financing choice simply follows the order of internal financing, debt financing and equity
financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The argument is such that due to asymmetric informa-
tion, the financial market cannot distinguish a good project from a bad one. Avoiding to be
discounted, a firm with a good investment project will not go to the equity market to raise
additional funds, instead it would prefer to use internal funds or debt. Apart from the trade-
off hypothesis and “pecking-order" hypothesis, other theories have also been developed to
explain a firm’s capital structure choices2.
The main objective of this paper is to empirically test the determinants of capital struc-
ture choice for Dutch firms. In particular, we also identify the factors that are pertaining
1For a comprehensive survey, readers can refer to Harris and Raviv (1991) .
2For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that debt may induce shareholders expropriate wealth
from bondholders. Myers (1977) argues that a firm may forgo a positive NPV project if it perceives that the
profit generated from the project will be used mainly to pay-off existing debt. Smith and Warner (1979) point
out that debt convenants can not totally solve the conflict of interest between bondholders and shareholders
because these convenants not only can prevent a firm from enganging in value-decreasing projects but also
from engaging in value-increasing projects. Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986) and Zwiebel (1996)
discuss the agency costs arised from the separation of ownership and control, mainly the conflict of interest
between managers and shareholders, they suggest using debt as a disciplining device. Ross (1977, Miller and
Rock (1985) and Ambarish et al. propose that a firm’s capital structure choice as well as dividend policy may
be used as signaling devices given that there is asymmetric information between informed managers and un-
informed outside shareholders. Titman (1984), Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991)
argue that capital structure choice can be affected by the industrial structure a firm is facing.
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to the specific institutional settings in the Netherlands. The approach used in this paper is
the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. In capital structure theory, the attributes
identified as determinants of a firm’s capital structure choice are often not directly observed.
That is, there is no single accounting indicator that can be used as an exact representation of
each attribute. Instead, the theoretical attributes are often related to one or more accounting
indicators (often referred to as proxies of the attributes) with embedded measurement error.
Consequently, in the empirical analysis of capital structure choice, in order to investigate the
relationship between the capital structure and various attributes or factors, one also needs
to identify the relationship between the theoretical attributes and certain observed account-
ing indicators. In the structural equation modeling framework, the former relationship is
referred to as the structural model, while the latter relationship is referred to as the measure-
ment model. The structural equation modeling provides a flexible and powerful approach of
simultaneously assessing the quality of measurement and examining the structural relations
underlying the theory. In the structural model, we identify the attributes or factors that may
affect a firm’s leverage based on various theories of capital structure with consideration of
the unique aspect of the institutional setting in the Netherlands. In the measurement model,
various leverage measures and proxies for the attributes or factors are constructed based on
accounting data, keeping in mind the specific Dutch accounting rules and tax laws. Different
from previous studies, observed variables in our model have been carefully re-scaled in order
to be consistent with model assumptions. For instance, in order to conform with the linear
structure of the model and multivariate normality assumption, we use logarithmic standard
deviation, instead of standard deviations, of net income and earnings before interest and tax
as proxies of a firm’s earning volatility. Our analysis shows that this has led to significant
improvement in the robustness of parameters estimates.
Our empirical findings shed many important insights on Dutch firms’ financing behavior.
Firstly, non-debt tax shield (measured by the provision ratio in the Dutch case), which has
so far been ignored in the literature, is shown to be a very important factor of Dutch capital
structure choice, for both long-term leverage and short-term leverage. Secondly, another im-
portant factor that has so far been ignored in the literature is the flexibility component, which
is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities over current assets. Our results
suggest that firms with higher level of flexibility, i.e. higher ratios of cash and marketable
securities over current assets, tend to have significantly lower leverage. Thirdly, while both
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tangibility and size are positively related to long-term leverage, measured by either book
value or market value, size has no significant relationship with short-term debt, and tangibil-
ity is negatively related to short-term leverage. The negative relationship between tangibility
and short-term debt along with the positive relationship between tangibility and long-term
debt may suggest that firms prefer long-term debt to short term debt if it has enough col-
lateral assets. Furthermore, our results provide evidence supporting the “static trade-off”
hypothesis. While the “pecking-order” behavior is observed for Dutch firms, our results cast
doubt on the rationale of asymmetric information behind the “pecking-order” hypothesis.
Finally, we also point out that the static cross-section evidence is not sufficient to conclude
whether or not the management of Dutch firms is entrenched. Models based on the dynamic
behavior of firms’ capital structure choice are called for such tests, which we will pursue in
a separate research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a discussion of the
attributes or factors that are identified by various theories as determinants of a firm’s capital
structure choice, with a brief discussion of the specific institutional settings pertaining to
capital structure choice of Dutch firms. Section 3 describes the data set used in our study.
Section 4 presents the structural equation model of the capital structure, with discussions on
both the structural model and measurement model. Section 5 presents the empirical results
and discuss their implications on Dutch firms’ financing behavior. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Determinants of Capital Structure
To better understand the purpose of this paper and the empirical results of our model, we first
present a brief discussion of the institutional settings in the Netherlands that are pertaining
to capital structure choice. Instead of being general and extensive, we focus our discussion
only on certain aspects that are unique to the Dutch system.
2.1 Dutch Institutional Settings Pertaining to Capital Structure Choice
A. Tax laws and accounting rules. Not surprisingly, Dutch firms’ financing behavior is re-
lated to certain aspects of the corporate tax laws. There is a very unique line on the consoli-
dated balance sheets of Dutch firms, which is called “the provision for bad debt and pension
liability.” In the remaining of the paper, we refer to it as provision. According to the Dutch
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tax laws, the provision for bad debt can either be subtracted directly from account receiv-
ables on the left-hand side of the balance sheet, or be 100% tax deductible against income
and with the remaining portion added back to the provision on the right-hand side of the
balance sheet3. The same applies to pension liability4. The provision amount is a very sig-
nificant portion of the right-hand side of the balance sheet for Dutch firms. From Table 2 we
can see that the average book value long-term leverage, defined as book value of long term
debt over book value of total capital assets, is 18.9% for Dutch firms in our sample over the
period of 1994-1996, whereas the provision ratio, defined as the provision over book value
of total capital assets, is 12.1% over the same period. It is also noted that, due to not so fa-
vorable tax rules, stock buy back has not been a very common practice for Dutch companies.
B. Financial institutions. Banks and other financial institutions in the Netherlands play a
very important role in firms’ debt financing. From Table 1 we can see that the credit market
plays a relatively insignificant role in the Netherlands, compared with other European coun-
tries. Direct debt financing from banks and other financial institutions account for about 97%
of debt financing to the private sector in the Netherlands5. Firm-bank relationship is high-
lighted by the fact that on average a firm has about one interlocking directorate (De Jong and
Van Dijk, 1999).
C. Corporate governance issues. The concentration ratio of ownership is very high in the
Netherlands, on average 41.4% of a firm’s equity is owned by top three largest shareholders
(De Jong and Van Dijk, 1999). Takeover defenses are broadly used by Dutch firms6. Usu-
3For example, if a firm has NLG100 bad debt, it can subtract this amount from its income, assuming the
firm’s corporate tax rate is 35%, the NLG(100-35)=NLG65 is added to the provision on the right hand side of
the balance sheet.
4However, it is worth to mention that the pension liability included in the provision is only for top man-
agement. The regular employee pension contributions by employers are deducted as a part of the personnel
costs.
5Also from Table 1, we can see that the concentration level of the Dutch banking sector is extremely high
compared with other European countries. This may infer that the cost of debt financing in the Netherlands are
higher compared with other countries simply due to the industrial structure of Dutch banking sector.
6According to De Jong and Van Dijk (1999), (1) 39.3% of the Dutch firms have priority shares that allow
a small number of shares to carry superior voting rights. (2) 63.0% of the Dutch firms have preferred shares
arrangement which allows an issue of preferred shares with only 25% of the nominal value to be paid up without
further shareholders’approval. (3) In case of a takeover threat, the firm can place the priority shares and the
4
Table 1: Capital structure choice comparison across European countries
Country Leverage Leverage Indirect (%) Banks (%) Concentration Long (%)
Year 1982 1992 1993 1992 1995 1993
Germany 1.71 1.53 94 89 19.8 78
France 2.61 1.35 85 85 24.5 73
Italy 4.87 3.24 95 89 24.0 44
UK 1.13 1.04 81 92 30.9 50
Belgium 2.50 1.54 93 90 52.3 63
Holland 1.33 1.27 97 73 73.8 77
Note: All figures in the table are from De Bondt (1998). “Leverage" refers to the debt-equity ratio at book
value; “indirect" refers to the share of the indirect credit market in % of total credit to private sector; “banks
(%)" refers to the share of loans from banks in % of total loans to the private sector; “concentration" refers to
the share of the top three banks in % of total assets of banks; “long (%)" refers to the share of long-term credit
in % of credit of the corporate sector.
ally Dutch firms adopt multiple anti-takeover barriers. In addition, as for the composition of
supervisory board, Dutch firms adopt a process which is often referred to as the “co-option
system” where the new members of the supervisory board are elected by the current mem-
bers.
D. Bankruptcy Laws. As the Dutch bankruptcy law gives more weight to creditors’
protection relative to facilitating firms to re-organize and to turn around, firms entering
bankruptcy are very likely to be liquidated. Since the liquidation value is generally lower
than going concern value, bankruptcy cost is considered to be higher in the Netherlands.
2.2 The Attributes that Affect Capital Structure
The consensus of the attributes that affect capital structure choice is “leverage increases with
fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, investment opportunities, and firm size, decreases with
volatility, advertising expenditure, the probability of bankruptcy, profitability and unique-
ness of the product” (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Due to the unavailability of data, advertising
expenditure and uniqueness of the product are not included in our analysis.
preferred shares with a befriended party in exchange for a loan. (4) For 38.3% of the Dutch firms, shareholders
own receipts which carry the cashflow rights without the voting rights. (5) 8.3% of the Dutch firms’share only
have limited voting power, irrespective of the number of shares an entity possesses.
5
A. Provision Ratio (PROV)
As mentioned earlier, Dutch firms have a somewhat unique way to shelter their income,
which is called the “provision for bad debt and pension liability" on the right-hand side of
a firm’s consolidated balance sheet. There is no consensus to whether provision should be
treated as equity or liability. From a theoretical point of view, provisions (here excluding
deferred tax) are clearly liabilities. However, technically, there is no interest cost on these
liabilities, the timing and the amount of provisions being added to the balance sheet is at the
management’s discretion. Therefore, they are not liabilities in a strict sense. Whether or not
provisions should be treated as liabilities can directly affect the leverage ratio of Dutch firms.
Since the creation of such a line in the consolidated balance sheet is for income smoothing
purpose with tax benefit rather than for financing purpose, we classify the provision as non-
debt tax shield. Therefore in our analysis, provision is classified neither as debt nor equity.
According to the “static trade-off" hypothesis, we expect the relationship between leverage
and provision ratio to be negative7.
We use provision ratio, the provision of bad debt and pension liability over total capital
assets which consist of long-term debt, short-term debt, equity and provision (PROV-TA) as
the measure of provision (PROV). We argue that this is the most significant and meaningful
variable as a proxy of non-debt tax shield in the Dutch case8. Cools (1993) uses depreciation
ratio9 (depreciation over book value of total assets) and intangible assets ratio (intangible
assets over book value of total assets) as proxy of non-debt tax shield. However, our under-
standing is that depreciation ratio is set according to certain accounting rules to reflect the
7Of course, the lower lever of leverage can not only be caused by the non-debt tax shield ratio. If one
believes that Dutch banks and other financial institutions play a role in monitoring firm’s financing behavior
(after all, 97% of the Dutch private debts are lent by them and only 3% of the private debts are raised from
the capital market), it is understandable these banks and financial institutions will make certain that firms they
finance are not over-levered beyond their comfort level. Also, the stringent Dutch bankruptcy law perhaps is
another factor which prevents firms to use too much debt
8Some authors use R&D as proxy of non-debt tax shield (Bradley et al, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988).
However, only a very limited firms report this amount in the Netherlands. Others use investment tax credits as
proxy of non-debt tax shield (Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; and MacKie-Mason, 1990), but
such an item is not applicable to the Dutch case (Cools, 1993).
9Depreciation ratio is also used in some U.S. studies, DeAngelo and Maslis (1980), Auerbach (1985), Kim
and Sörensen, 1986, and Titman and Wessels (1988), e.g.
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remaining value of the underlying assets. Based on our sample, we do not find the relation-
ship between depreciation ratio and leverages anywhere near significant. The problem with
respect to using intangible assets ratio as proxy of non-debt tax shield is that not all intangi-
ble assets are recorded on the balance sheet for Dutch companies. As a matter of fact, only
a very small portion of the total intangible assets, mainly patents, are recorded as intangible
assets on the balance sheet. Goodwills due to acquisitions are completely written-off when
they occur.
B. Tangibility (TANG)
The main reason for tangibility to be positively related to a firm’s leverage is because
lenders want to assure that their loans are backed up by some collateral assets. Therefore,
the higher a firm’s asset tangibility is, the higher the leverage can be. Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976) and Myers (1977) further argue that collateralization is an important feature of
debt covenant because collateralized loans can only be used in specified projects. There-
fore, collateralization can be used to mitigate the conflict of interest between shareholders
and lenders in the sense that shareholders cannot expropriate wealth from lenders to engage
in extra risky projects. Firms without collateral assets may find it too costly to use debt
financing, consequently, they may prefer equity financing.
The positive sign between leverage and asset tangibility is also supported by other argu-
ments. For example, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that if a firm has to go to the debt
market to raise funds, it is only advantageous for it to sell secured debt, i.e. with collateral.
The costs associated with selling un-secured debt may be high enough due to asymmetric
information to discourage firms issuing un-secured debt, this is the “pecking order” type of
explanation with respect to the relationship between tangibility and leverage. We use fixed
assets over total assets (FA-TA) as the measure of tangibility (TANG).
C. Size (SIZE)
It is argued that larger firms tend to be more diversified in their projects, therefore, the
probability of total failure, i.e. bankruptcy, is relatively smaller (Bradley et al. 1984; Long
and Malitz, 1985; Harris and Raviv, 1991; and Rajan and Zingales, 1995) . Size is often
used as an inverse proxy for probability of bankruptcy and is considered to be positively
correlated to firms’ leverage.
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The positive relationship between size and leverage is also viewed as support of “asym-
metric information" argument (Myers andMajluf, 1984). It is suggested that the bigger a firm
is, there is less information asymmetry, i.e. outsiders have more information about the firm.
Therefore, it will be easier for larger firms to get access to loans. We use three variables as
proxies of size: logarithmic transformation of sales (lnSALES), logarithmic transformation
of total number of workers (lnWORKER) and logarithmic transformation of equity market
value (lnMV).
D. Growth Opportunity (GROWTH)
“Pecking-order" hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between leverage and growth
opportunity. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), information asymmetry demands an
extra premium for firms to raise external funds irrespective of the true quality of their invest-
ment project. In the case of issuing debt, the extra premium is reflected in the higher required
yield. Firms with growth opportunities may find it too costly to rely on debt to finance its
growth. The “under-investment" agency problem also suggests a negative relationship be-
tween leverage and growth. Highly leveraged firms are more likely to pass up profitable
investment opportunities (Myers, 1977). We use three variables as proxies of growth: per-
centage change in total asset market value (dTA), percentage change in sales (dSALES) and
logarithmic transformation of market to book ratio (lnMBR).
E. Profitability (PROF)
“Pecking-order" hypothesis suggests that firms prefer to use internal funds versus exter-
nal funds for capital expenditure (Myers and Majluf, 1984). A profitable firm presumably
has more internal funds at its disposal than a less profitable firm. Therefore, the relation-
ship between profitability and leverage should be negative. However, Jensen (1986) argues
that the relationship between leverage and profitability depends on the effectiveness of the
market for corporate control. If the market for corporate control is effective, managers of
profitable firms are forced to pay out cash by leveraging up; on the supply side, lenders are
also more willing to lend to profitable firms. Therefore, the relationship between leverage
and profitability can be positive. On the other hand, if the market for corporate control is
ineffective, managers of profitable firms may choose to avoid the disciplining role of debt
by leveraging down, then the relationship between leverage and profitability can be negative.
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We use two variables as proxies of profitability: the ratio of EBIT over sales (EBIT-SAL)
and return on equity (ROE).
F. Earnings volatility (VOLA)
The “static trade-off" hypothesis, “pecking-order" hypothesis, agency costs related the-
ories and product market interaction consideration all predict the negative relationship be-
tween leverage and earnings volatility. We use two variables as proxies of earnings volatility:
the logarithmic transformation of standard deviation of net income (lnSdNI) and the loga-
rithmic transformation of standard deviation of EBIT (lnSdEBIT).
G. Flexibility (FLEX)
Financial flexibility is usually referred to as the amount of cash that firms build up over
time. It can be viewed as negative debt. If there is no effective market for corporate control,
management would prefer to retain excess amount of cash (Opler, et al. 1999). “Pecking-
order" hypothesis also suggests that there should be a negative relationship between leverage
and flexibility. We define the financial flexibility as the ratio of cash and marketable securi-
ties over current assets (C$-CA).
H. Industry Dummy (INDU)
To control for industry specific effects on firms’ capital structure choice, industry dummy
(INCODE) is included in our analysis. We group firms according to NACE (European Com-
munity Classification of Economic Activities) criteria and set values for the industry dummy
variable.
2.3 Measures of Capital Structure
We use four measures of financial leverage in our analysis. They are book value long-term
and short term debt divided by book value total capital assets (LEVBL and LEVBS), and
market value long-term and short term debt divided by market value total capital assets
(LEVML and LEVMS). Due to data limitation, the book-value debt is used as an approxi-
mation of market-value debt.
The book value of total capital assets is calculated as follows. From the consolidated
balance sheet, we move the current liability (excluding short term debt) from the right-hand
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side of the balance sheet to the left-hand side of the balance sheet, this item can be subtracted
from the current assets, the net amount is the net working capital (excluding short term
debt). As a result, the items remaining on the right-hand side of the balance sheet are short
term debt, long term debt, equity, provision for bad debt and pension liability, and minority
interest. The sum of the first four items gives us the book-value of total capital assets used
in calculating leverages. To be comparable among firms, minority interest is not included
in the total capital assets10. To calculate the market value leverages, the sum of book value
short-term and long-term debt, provision and market value equity is used as approximation
of the market value of total capital assets.
3 The Data
The variables discussed in the previous sections are analyzed over the period of 1992 through
1997. The source of all the data except for the industry code is the “Jaarboek van Nederlandse
Ondernemingen". The industry code is based on the NACE activity list.
From the total sample, we deleted all the financial firms (banks, insurance companies
and investment companies) and firms that did not have a complete record on the variables
required in our analysis. In total, 118 firms are available.
The sampling period is divided into three sub-periods: 1993-1995, 1994-1996, and 1995-
1997, with one year lead between successive sub-period. The average of each variable over
the sub-periods is calculated. Averaging over three years reduces the measurement error
due to year over year random fluctuations. The dependent variables, i.e. the leverages, are
measured during the sub-period of 1994-1996. Three indicators of expected future growth
(dTA, dSALES, lnMBR) are calculated over the sub-period of 1995-1997. The idea is to
use the realized values as proxies of the expected future growth when the capital structure
decision is made. The variables used as indicators of size and profitability are calculated over
the sub-period of 1993-1995. The idea of using earlier period to calculate profitability and
size proxies is to treat them as realized information. The standard deviations of net income
and EBIT are calculated over the whole sample period in order to obtain better estimates.
10If the minority interest is included, then firms with minority interest will appear to be less levered. How-
ever, there is no way for us to know the capital structure of the minority firm. If the minority firm is highly
levered, then the leverage ratio we obtain by including minority interest can be quite distorted.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Data
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev
LEVBL 0.189 0.180 0.000 0.625 0.156
LEVBS 0.106 0.068 0.000 0.680 0.118
LEVML 0.137 0.107 0.000 0.613 0.133
LEVMS 0.076 0.045 0.000 0.553 0.098
PROV-TA 0.121 0.107 0.010 0.551 0.085
FA-TA 0.351 0.359 0.016 0.925 0.178
lnSALES 13.314 13.305 8.859 18.197 1.786
lnWORKER 7.527 7.546 3.723 12.618 1.793
lnMV 12.507 12.270 8.624 17.924 1.869
dTA 0.209 0.168 -0.159 1.47 0.251
dSALES 0.125 0.117 -0.246 0.661 0.140
lnMBR 0.862 0.687 -0.371 3.705 0.789
EBIT-SAL 0.061 0.057 -0.017 0.209 0.040
ROE 0.141 0.144 -0.409 0.817 0.147
lnSdNI -0.551 -0.612 -3.784 3.342 1.329
lnSdEBIT -0.963 -1.116 -3.529 3.369 1.234
C$-CA 0.176 0.125 0.001 0.842 0.179
INCODE 5.084 4.000 2.000 9.000 1.994
Note: Data Source is the “Jaarboek van Nederlandse Ondernemingen".
Number of firms: 118
Other variables are calculated contemporaneously with dependent variables, that is over the
sub-period of 1994-1996. The summary statistics of the data is reported in Table 2.
4 The Structural Equation Model (SEM)
A unique and important aspect of the capital structure theory is that many theoretical at-
tributes or factors identified as the determinants of a firm’s capital structure choice are often
non-directly observed variables or latent variables. That is, there is no single accounting in-
dicator that can be used as the exact representation of each factor. Consequently, traditional
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regression model has often relied on various proxies of the unobserved theoretical attributes
for empirical analysis. The main drawbacks of the regression model approach, as also sum-
marized in Titman and Wessels (1988) , are as follows. First, in the case that there are more
than one possible proxy for a particular attribute, choosing a single indicator as proxy may
lead to biased parameter estimates and invalid test statistics. Second, it is often difficult to
find measures of particular attributes that are unrelated to other attributes. Third, since the
observed variables are proxies of the attributes, their use in regression analysis introduces
an errors-in-variable (EIV) problem which will cause biased parameter estimates. Finally,
measurement errors in the proxy variables may be correlated with measurement errors in the
dependent variables, creating spurious effects.
The approach used in this paper is the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique,
with linear relation among all variables11. Very briefly, this method assumes that, although
the relevant theoretical attributes are not directly observable, we can observe a number of
indicator variables that are linear functions of one or more attributes and a random error
term. The model consists of two parts: a structural model that describes the relationship
between capital structure and various theoretical attributes, and a measurement model that
identifies the relationship between the attributes and various indicators or proxy variables, in
this particular case, the accounting data. The capital structure theory does not specify any
functional form for how exactly the factors or attributes are related to a firm’s leverage and a
firm’s accounting indicators. In order to estimate the model, we impose the linear structure
on all relations. That is, we only intend to investigate the first order relation among all vari-
ables, i.e. the sign and significance of the coefficients. The main advantage of the structural
equation modeling is that it provides a unique analysis that simultaneously considers ques-
tions of both measurement and structural relations. Unlike exploratory factor analysis which
is guided by intuitive and ad hoc rules, the measurement model casts a factor analysis in the
tradition of hypothesis testing with explicit tests of both the overall quality of measurement
and the specific factor loadings composing the model. Unlike the multiple regression analy-
sis that are exploring the statistical relationship among only observed variables, the structural
model allows for the specification and testing of complex “path” or structural relations.
The model we estimate is an application of the LISREL system developed by K. Jöreskog
11References to linear structural modeling can also be found in the literature under the headings of analysis-
of-covariance structures, path analysis, causal models, and content-variables models. A nontechnical introduc-
tion to the subject providing many references is Bentler and Bonett (1980).
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and D. Sörbom (1981). In particular, in our model set-up, only the exogenous variables, i.e.
the theoretical attributes of capital structure choice, are unobserved or latent variables, while
the endogenous variables , i.e. the leverage measures of a firm, are directly observed, free of
measurement error. The measurement model is specified as follows:
x = Λξ + δ, (1)
where x is a q × 1 vector of observable indicators, i.e. accounting data, ξ is anm× 1 vector
of unobserved exogenous firm-specific attributes, Λ is a q ×m matrix of factor loadings of
x on ξ, and δ is a q × 1 vector of measurement error. In our model, we have 14 indicator
variables for eight attributes–thus, x is a matrix of dimension 14 × 1 and Λ is a matrix of
dimension 14× 8.
The structural model is specified as the following system of equations:
y = Γξ + ε, (2)
Where y is a p× 1 vector of endogenous variable, i.e. the measures of leverage, Γ is a p×m
matrix of structural coefficients, and ε is a p × 1 vector of disturbance terms. The model is
estimated for two separate 2 × 1 vectors of debt: short-term and long term debt scaled by
book value and market value of total capital assets respectively.
Equation (1) simply states that, although the firm-specific attributes that are believed to be
the determinants of capital structure cannot be observed, a number of other variables denoted
as indicators or proxies are observable. These indicator variables can be expressed as linear
function of one or more of the unobservable attributes and a random measurement error.
The principal advantage of this estimation procedure over standard regression models is that
it explicitly specifies the relation between the unobservable attributes and the observable
variables. Equation (2) can be understood as a regression model except that the explanatory
variables may be unobserved latent factors.
In order to identify the estimated equations, certain restrictions must be imposed. In most
factor-analysis models, the common factors are constrained to be orthogonal and scaled to
have unit variances, and the residuals are assumed to be uncorrelated. However, since the
common factors in this study are given definite interpretations by identifying them with
specific attributes, the assumption that the common factors are uncorrelated is untenable as
many firm-specific attributes are likely to be correlated (e.g. profitability and growth). For
this reason, the correlations among the unobserved attributes (the matrix Ψ) are estimated
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Table 3: The Structure of the Measurement Model– LAMBDA-X
PROV TANG SIZE GROWTH PROF VOLA FLEX INDU δ
PROV-TA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FA-TA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
lnSALES 0 0 λ3,3 0 0 0 0 0 δ3
lnWORKER 0 0 λ4,3 0 0 0 0 0 δ4
lnMV 0 0 λ5,3 0 0 0 0 0 δ5
dTA 0 0 0 λ6,4 0 0 0 0 δ6
dSALES 0 0 0 λ7,4 0 0 0 0 δ7
lnMBR 0 0 0 λ8,4 0 0 0 0 δ8
EBIT-SAL 0 0 0 0 λ9,5 0 0 0 δ9
ROE 0 0 0 0 λ10,5 0 0 0 δ10
lnSdNI 0 0 0 0 0 λ11,6 0 0 δ11
lnSdEBIT 0 0 0 0 0 λ12,6 0 0 δ12
C$-CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
INCODE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
within the model. Of course, in order to achieve identification, additional restrictions on the
parameters of the model must be imposed.
In total, we have imposed 106 restrictions on the matrix Λ of factor loadings. These are
shown in Table 3 as the factor loadings are exogenously specified to equal either one or zero.
For example, since lnSALES is not assumed to be an indicator of TANG, its factor loading
on the TANG attribute is set to be zero and is not estimated within the model. In addition, we
have also constrained the measurement error in the equation of indicator variables PROV-TA,
FA-TA, C$-CA and INCODE to be zero, implying that the factor loadings of these variables
on their respective attributes are constrained to equal one. Also, we have assumed that the
measurement errors, δ, are uncorrelated with each other, with the attributes, and with the
disturbance terms in the structural equations12.
In contrast to the measurement model, the structural model is totally unrestricted. The
model estimates the impact of each of the attributes on each of the different financial lever-
ages. In other words, none of the factor loadings in the structural equations is fixed exoge-
12Since the restrictions may not all be appropriate, interpretations of the estimates should be made with
caution. It is quite likely, for example, that some of the measurement errors may in fact be correlated. It
is unfortunate that there is an arbitrary element in the choice of identifying restrictions. However, similar
restrictions must be made implicitly in order to interpret a standard regression model that uses proxy variables.
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nously. In addition, the correlations between the residual errors in the structural equations
are estimated within the model. This allows for the possibility that there exist additional at-
tributes, not considered in the model, that are determinants of each of the financial leverages.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimation
The parameters of our model are estimated using the maximum likelihood (ML) method. The
basic idea is to fit the covariance matrix of observable variables implied by the specification
of the model (Σ) to the covariance matrix (S) of these variables observed from the sampling
observations. In the LISREL system, this is done by minimizing the function,
F = ln(detΣ)− ln(detS) + tr(SΣ−1)− (p+ q), (3)
with respect to the vector of parameters in the matrices discussed in the previous section.
This objective function is derived from maximum-likelihood procedures and assumes that
the observed variables are conditionally multinormally distributed.
The asymptotic properties of the ML estimates and the hypothesis test statistics are de-
rived based on large sample size and multivariate normality assumption. To conform with
linear structure of the model and the normality assumption, we rescale certain variables
by taking logarithms, e.g. as in other studies, for total sales (lnSALES), total workers
(lnWORKER), and equity market value (lnMV), which are all proxies for firm size. Dif-
ferent from previous studies, we also rescale the standard deviation of net income (SdNI)
and the standard deviation of EBIT (SdEBIT) by taking logarithms, both of which are the
proxies of a firm’s earning volatility. Standard deviations can only take non-negative values
and are obviously not normally distributed. However, both the plots and summary statis-
tics suggest that it is quite reasonable to assume logarithmic standard deviation following
normal distribution, for both net income and EBIT. Moreover, our analysis also shows that
the parameter estimates based on using SdNI and SdEBIT as proxies of volatility are much
less robust than using lnSdNI and lnSdEBIT as proxies for volatility. This is due to the fact
that, without rescaling the standard deviation, very high earnings volatilities for certain firms
appear to be outliers. In addition, the quality of measurement is also significantly improved
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based on lnSdNI and lnSdEBIT. Similar findings are observed for the market book ratio
(MBR) after rescaling by taking logarithms (lnMBR).
5.2 Estimates of the Parameters
The estimates of the parameters of the measurement model are reported in Tables 4 and 5. All
factor loadings are highly significant. The estimates are generally in accord with our a priori
ideas about how well the indicator variables measure the unobserved attributes. Both the
direction and the magnitude, as well as the statistical significance, of the estimates suggest
that these indicators capture the theoretical attributes we wish to consider as determinants of
capital structure choice.
The estimates of the structural coefficients are reported in Table 6. These coefficients
specify the estimated impact of various attributes or factors on the financial leverages. For
the most part, the coefficient estimates for the long-term and short-term leverages are of
the predicted sign from our earlier discussion. The estimation results are summarized as fol-
lows. Firstly, among the most significant factors of the capital structure choice are the PROV,
TANG, SIZE and FLEX, while GROWTH, PROF, VOLA and INDU are among the least sig-
nificant factors. Secondly, PROV and FLEX are both negatively related to a firm’s long-term
and short-term leverages, regardless whether it is measured by book value or market value.
However, for the market value based short-term leverage, these two factors are not highly
significant. Thirdly, TANG is positively correlated with both book value and market value
based long-term leverages, but negatively correlated with short-term leverages, although not
highly significant for market value based short-term leverage. SIZE is positively related to
both book value and market value based long-term leverages, but has mixed signs for short-
term leverage when measured by book value, although neither of them is highly significant.
Fourthly, among all four leverage measures, the long-term leverages, measured by both book
value and market value, behave most systematically with three highly significant factors, i.e.
PROV, TANG, and SIZE. To the contrast, the short-term leverages behave less systemati-
cally, with the book value based short-term leverage having three highly significant factors,
i.e. PROV, TANG and FLEX, while the market value based short-term leverage having no
significant factors (at 10% critical level). Finally, based on the goodness-of-fit tests, the
estimated models explain virtually none of the cross-sectional variation in a firm’s leverage.
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Table 4: Measurement Model: Factor Loadings for Independent Variables-LAMBDA-X
PROV TANG SIZE GROWTH PROF VOLA FLEX INDU σ2δ
PROV-TA 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.00
FA-TA - - 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.00
lnSALES - - – 0.96 - - - - - - - - - - 0.07
(0.06)
15.81
lnWORKER - - - - 0.97 - - - - - - - - - - 0.05
(0.06)
16.15
lnMV - - - - 0.91 - - - - - - - - - - 0.17
(0.06)
14.33
dTA - - - - - - 0.68 - - - - - - - - 0.54
(0.08)
8.45
dSALES - - - - - - 0.43 - - - - - - - - 0.82
(0.09)
5.01
lnMBR - - - - - - 0.87 - - - - - - - - 0.25
(0.08)
11.26
EBIT-SAL - - - - - - - - 0.60 - - - - - - 0.64
(0.08)
7.24
ROE - - - - - - - - 0.71 - - - - - - 0.50
(0.08)
8.57
lnSdNI - - - - - - - - - - 0.82 - - - - 0.32
(0.07)
11.00
lnSdEBIT - - - - - - - - - - 0.83 - - - - 0.32
(0.07)
11.07
C$-CA - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 - - 0.00
INCODE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 0.00
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Table 5: Estimated Correlations between Attributes







SIZE 0.37 0.13 1.00
(0.08) (0.08)
4.61 1.52
GROWTH -0.05 -0.38 0.22 1.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
-0.55 -4.32 2.41
PROF 0.00 -0.28 0.34 0.79 1.00
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
-0.05 -2.68 3.46 9.82
VOLA -0.14 0.08 -0.40 -0.49 -0.83 1.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
-1.53 0.84 -4.99 -5.76 -11.13
FLEX 0.08 -0.11 0.09 0.22 0.35 -0.22 1.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12)
1.01 -1.35 1.02 2.42 3.36 -2.47 8.57
INDU 0.10 -0.15 0.07 0.34 0.40 -0.15 0.30 1.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12)
1.23 -1.83 0.83 3.77 3.92 -1.60 6.49 6.66
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Table 6: Estimates of Structural Coefficients-GAMMA
PROV TANG SIZE GROWTH PROF VOLA FLEX INDU
LEVBL -0.26 0.51 0.35 0.49 -0.40 0.19 -0.16 0.09
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.35) (0.80) (0.49) (0.10) (0.14)
-2.37 6.08 3.83 1.39 -0.50 0.38 -1.72 0.61
LEVBS -0.34 -0.27 -0.04 0.05 -0.52 -0.15 -0.26 0.05
(0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.39) (0.93) (0.59) (0.11) (0.17)
-2.69 -3.01 -0.46 0.13 -0.57 -0.25 -2.49 0.31
LEVML -0.22 0.45 0.32 0.20 -0.66 -0.05 -0.13 0.21
(0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.30) (0.64) (0.41) (0.10) (0.13)
-2.03 5.24 3.29 0.66 -1.03 -0.13 -1.29 1.60
LEVMS -0.60 -0.30 0.10 0.68 -2.74 -1.58 -0.02 0.50
(0.74) (0.27) (0.37) (2.46) (6.01) (3.79) (0.61) (1.00)
-0.82 -1.12 0.28 0.28 -0.46 -0.42 -0.04 0.50
5.3 Robustness of Estimation Results
As we have mentioned earlier, inappropriate scaling of observed variables may cause the
estimation results to be non-robust. In this paper, we have carefully re-scaled the observed
variables, in particular the proxies of GROWTH and VOLA. An examination of the correla-
tion matrix of the sample data (Tables 7 and 8) provides further insights about the robustness
of our results.
From Tables 7 and 8, we can see that firstly, there are no pair of variables, as proxies
of different factors, that are highly correlated. This suggests that no individual variable will
likely cause serious spurious effect. Secondly, there is no proxy variable that is highly cor-
related with all leverage measures. Noticeably, while FA-TA has relatively high correlations
with LEVBL and LEVMS, the correlations with LEVBS and LEVML are very low. This
suggests that there is no obvious spurious effect caused by scaling (i.e. divided by TA).
However, a further examination of the correlation matrix of all factors or attributes sug-
gest that we have to be very careful in interpreting the estimation results in a multivariate
model framework. Notice from Table 5 that GROWTH, PROF and VOLA in our sample of
Dutch firms are all highly correlated with each other, namely corr(GROWTH, PROF)=0.55
(0.09), corr(GROWTH, VOLA)= -0.39 (0.08), and corr(PROF, VOLA)=-0.85 (0.07), where
the numbers in the brackets are standard errors. The estimation results suggest that in the
multivariate model, none of GROWTH, PROF and VOLA is a significant factor of the capital
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix of Sample Data
LEVBL LEVBS LEVMS LEVMS PROV-TA FA-TA lnSALES lnWORKER lnMV
LEVBL 1.000
LEVBS 0.591 1.000
LEVML 0.840 0.075 1.000
LEVMS 0.083 0.909 0.196 1.000
PROV-TA -0.119 -0.384 -0.029 -0.342 1.000
FA-TA 0.463 -0.186 0.543 -0.093 0.128 1.000
lnSALES 0.168 -0.266 0.119 -0.227 0.352 0.096 1.000
lnWORKER 0.228 -0.348 0.169 -0.318 0.388 0.156 0.936 1.000
lnMV 0.156 -0.351 -0.026 -0.395 0.257 0.0636 0.880 0.881 1.000
dTA -0.174 -0.248 -0.240 -0.302 0.015 -0.236 0.054 0.077 0.111
dSALES -0.005 -0.128 -0.162 -0.266 0.003 -0.117 0.027 0.045 0.139
lnMBR 0.031 -0.153 -0.307 -0.310 -0.065 -0.346 0.163 0.194 0.371
EBIT-SAL 0.048 -0.313 -0.185 -0.383 -0.077 0.017 0.150 0.236 0.470
ROE -0.258 -0.195 -0.330 -0.306 0.046 -0.318 0.202 0.179 0.288
lnSdNI 0.216 0.347 0.287 0.384 -0.147 0.013 -0.262 -0.249 -0.340
lnSdEBIT 0.183 0.248 0.300 0.268 -0.083 0.113 -0.371 -0.352 -0.389
C$-CA -0.259 -0.386 -0.290 -0.376 0.083 -0.112 0.041 0.066 0.237
INCODE -0.063 -0.193 -0.093 -0.164 0.102 -0.153 0.052 0.052 0.152
dTA dSALES lnMBR EBIT-SAL ROE lnSdNI lnSdEBIT C$-CA INCODE
dTA 1.000
dSALES 0.550 1.000
lnMBR 0.571 0.312 1.000
EBIT-SAL 0.165 0.221 0.397 1.000
ROE 0.465 0.164 0.499 0.433 1.000
lnSdNI -0.396 -0.212 -0.356 -0.456 -0.424 1.000
lnSdEBIT -0.258 -0.092 -0.309 -0.466 -0.484 0.680 1.000
C$-CA 0.181 0.014 0.191 0.309 0.177 -0.226 -0.143 1.000
INCODE 0.180 0.033 0.326 0.145 0.345 -0.135 -0.106 0.300 1.000
Table 8: Correlation Matrix of Sample Data(continued)
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structure choice. In other words, given other factors, none of the above factors individually
has a significant impact on the choice of a firm’s leverage. This does not mean that as these
factors all change together, there is no significant statistical relation between a firm’s lever-
age and each specific factor. For instance, if a theory predicts that growth is a significant
determinant of capital structure choice without specifying the environment, including the
correlations with other variables, then the findings of our model estimation is not necessarily
inconsistent with the theory. Furthermore, from the correlation matrix of the sample data in
Tables 7 and 8, we notice that not all proxies for the same factor or attribute have the same
signs of correlations with a specific leverage measure. For instance, for GROWTH prox-
ies, while the correlations between LEVBL and proxies dTA and lnMBR are negative, the
correlation between LEVBL and dSALES is positive. Similar findings are observed for the
proxies of PROF.While the findings by no means undermine our estimation results, they sug-
gest that choosing any one of the indicators as a single proxy of a factor may cause severely
biased parameter estimates and change the significance level of the tests.
5.4 Further Discussions
Our model has identified certain important factors, which have so far been ignored in pre-
vious studies as determinants, of capital structure choice for Dutch firms. Firstly, provision
ratio as non-debt tax shield is shown to be negatively correlated with a firm’s financial lever-
age. This suggests that the “static trade-off” hypothesis is strongly supported by the Dutch
evidence. Secondly, financial flexibility, measured by the ratio of cash and marketable se-
curities over current assets is also shown to be negatively correlated with a firm’s financial
leverages. Since a firm’s financial flexibility can also be viewed as internal debt, it provides
evidence to support the “pecking-order” behavior. However, from the mixing results of other
factors, the rationale of asymmetric information behind the “pecking-order” hypothesis is
not evident in the Dutch case. To the contrary, the asymmetric information argument is
more rejected than accepted. As predicted by the asymmetric information theory, growth,
profitability and earnings volatility should all be negatively related to a firm’s financial lever-
ages. Our empirical results suggest that signs between growth and leverages are consistently
contrary to what predicted by the theory. At the best, growth is an insignificant factor of cap-
ital structure for Dutch firms. A plausible explanation is that since 97% of the private debt
is issued by banks and other financial institutions instead of the capital market in the Nether-
21
lands, and on average, there is a representative of the lenders sitting in the board of directors,
there is less degree of information asymmetry between the lenders and the borrowers, i.e.
the firms.
Furthermore, the fact that financial flexibility is negatively related to a firm’s leverages
may make people draw the conclusion that the corporate management of Dutch firms is in
general entrenched. This conclusion appears to be further supported by the argument that
there is a lack of market for corporate control in the Netherlands (De Jong and Veld, 2001).
However, it should be cautioned that the negative sign be interpreted as the result of man-
agement entrenchment. This observation can also be caused by the fact that the management
of Dutch firms is extremely risk averse due to the stringent bankruptcy laws.
Finally, our empirical results also show that while tangibility is positively correlated with
long-term leverage, it is negatively correlated with short-term leverage, for both book-value
and market-value measures. Since tangibility measures the level of collateral assets, it is safe
to assume that firms with higher tangibility are more accessible to loans. Thus the above
results suggest that firms, when they can choose, tend to prefer long-term debt to short-term
debt.
6 Conclusion
This paper uses the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique to empirically test the de-
terminants of capital structure choice for Dutch firms. We include major factors identified by
various capital structure theories and construct proxies for these factors with consideration of
specific Dutch institutional settings. We also carefully rescale the observed variables in order
to conform with the linear structure of the model and the multivariate normality assumption.
Our empirical results shed many important insights on the Dutch firms’ financing behavior.
In particular, we identified important factors that have so far been ignored in the literature
for the Dutch capital structure choice. Furthermore, our results provide evidence supporting
the “static trade-off” hypothesis. While our results also imply the “pecking-order” behav-
ior of Dutch firms, they cast doubt on the rationale of asymmetric information behind the
“pecking-order” hypothesis. We also point out that the static cross-section analysis is not
sufficient to conclude whether or not the management of Dutch firms is entrenched. Models
based on dynamic behavior of firms’ capital structure choice are called for such tests, which
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we will pursue in a separate study.
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